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5
The two separating features of the CR that Raskolnikov discusses in the greatest detail are mandatory binding arbitration and the use of a strong pro-government presumption in the resolution of arbitrated disputes. 6 Both of these features would make it much easier for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to win disputes in the CR than in the DR. Non-gamers would not object to this, because they do not take tax reporting positions that they expect the IRS to contest. Gamers, by contrast, routinely take aggressive reporting positions, and they would have to choose the DR to preserve their chances of prevailing if the IRS detects and challenges their positions.
As Raskolnikov explains in detail, the observation that different taxpayers have different attitudes toward their compliance obligations is not original with him. 7 What is original is his proposal to respond to those differing attitudes by forcing taxpayers to reveal their compliance types, and then subjecting taxpayers to different enforcement regimes based on those revelations. Raskolnikov's proposal is an important addition to the scholarly literature on tax enforcement strategies. In my view, however, the current federal income tax enforcement regime has already slouched some considerable distance away from the one-size-fitsall model, in a manner not noted by Raskolnikov, by imposing stringent disclosure requirements on the most important category of gamers-the users of tax shelters. Part I of this Response describes the current tax shelter enforcement regime. Part II compares Raskolnikov's proposal with the current regime, and suggests that there are grounds for preferring the current regime to the proposal.
I. THE CURRENT TAX SHELTER ENFORCEMENT REGIME
Traditionally, a major attraction of tax shelters 8 to gamers was the opportunity to play the audit lottery. In many-probably mostsituations, gamer taxpayers using cost-benefit analysis would have decided against involvement in tax shelters if they knew the shelters would be detected and challenged by the IRS. Taking into account the low probability of prevailing in court, the likely imposition of an accuracy-related penalty, 9 and the costs of litigation, the expected value of the tax shelter commonly would have been negative. The calculus changed dramatically, however, once the odds of escaping detection (either by not being audited, or by the auditor missing the issue) were factored in. The chances of escaping detection were high enough to 
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induce gamers to participate in many tax shelters that they would have avoided if detection had been certain, or nearly certain.
In the wake of recent statutory and regulatory developments, however, taxpayers should assume that there is a near one hundred percent chance that the IRS will detect their shelters. Treasury regulations promulgated in 2003 require any taxpayer who has participated in a "reportable transaction" to file a "reportable transaction disclosure statement" with the IRS as a tax return attachment.
10 Reportable transactions are defined broadly enough to include most tax shelters. 14 If the taxpayer fails to disclose despite the threat of the nondisclosure penalty, the IRS is still likely to receive notice of the taxpayer's shelter from the tax shelter promoter. Section 6111 requires a "material advisor with respect to any reportable transaction" to disclose the details of the transaction to the IRS, 15 and section 6112 requires the advisor to maintain and make available to the IRS for inspection a list of the taxpayers investing in the shelter. 16 The Code imposes substantial penalties on promoters who fail to comply with these disclosure requirements.
17
If either the taxpayer or the tax shelter promoter complies with the disclosure requirements, the taxpayer will assume-probably 10. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a) (as amended in 2008). 11. Id. § 1.6011-4(b). 12. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(2). The regulation defines a listed transaction as "a transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed transaction." Id.
13. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(6). The regulation defines a transaction of interest as "a transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the IRS has identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a transaction of interest." Id.
14. American 17. For failures to comply with the disclosure requirements of § 6111, the penalty is $50,000 for each failure, or the greater of either $200,000 or fifty percent (seventy-five percent in the case of an intentional failure) of the material advisor's gross income from activities related to the shelter in the case of a listed transaction. Id. § 6707. For failing to make the list of taxpayer investors available to the IRS within twenty days of a request, the penalty is $10,000 for each day beyond the twentieth. Id. § 6708.
correctly-that the IRS will detect the shelter and challenge the claimed tax benefits. With the audit lottery thus nearly eliminated as a factor in the cost-benefit calculations, gamers should reject many shelters that would have attracted them before the imposition of the disclosure requirements.
Of course, the disclosure requirements solve the government's audit lottery problem only if taxpayers, their material advisors, or both, comply with the requirements. The new disclosure regime would fail if gamers and their advisors were to perform costbenefit analyses indicating that the optimal strategy is to ignore the disclosure requirements and hope the IRS remains oblivious. Judging from the comments of top-level Treasury and IRS officials, however, it appears that strategic noncompliance has not been a major problem. 19 Apparently the penalties for nondisclosure-which include, in addition to the civil penalties described above, possible prosecution under § 7203 for the misdemeanor offense of willfully failing to keep required tax records or supply required tax information-have been sufficient to dissuade gamers from continuing to play the tax shelter audit lottery by intentionally failing to comply with the new disclosure requirements.
II. IDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CURRENT TAX SHELTER DISCLOSURE REGIME AND THE RASKOLNIKOV PROPOSAL
The tax shelter disclosure requirements described above can be understood as a mechanism for separating gamers from non-gamers for the purpose of applying different enforcement regimes-in particular, different audit rates-to the two types of taxpayers. So understood, the disclosure requirements are very much in the spirit of Raskolnikov's proposal. Nevertheless, the two approaches differ in several important ways: (1) by attempting to identify only tax shelter investors rather than all gamers, the disclosure regime covers a smaller portion of the gamer population than would Raskolnikov's DR; (2) the current disclosure 
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regime relies on very high odds of detection combined with modest understatement penalties, whereas Raskolnikov's DR would rely on very large understatement penalties combined with relatively low odds of detection; and (3) the current disclosure regime has no effect on the enforcement regime applicable to non-gamers, whereas Raskolnikov's proposal would radically change the rules applicable to non-gamers under the CR. The three differences are described and evaluated below.
A. Tax Shelter Investors as Only a Subset of the Gamer Population
Raskolnikov includes within the gamer population not only tax shelter investors, but also tax evaders who "underpay their taxes without any justification at all," 20 and non-shelter tax avoiders (including those who "take aggressive reporting positions all by themselves," 21 without professional assistance). Raskolnikov's hope is that his proposed DR will attract not only tax shelter users, but also evaders and non-shelter avoiders. By contrast, the current disclosure-based antishelter regime applies only to tax shelter users. An advantage, then, of Raskolnikov's proposal over current law is its applicability to a larger percentage of the total gamer population. It is debatable, however, whether this is a very significant advantage. Raskolnikov himself suggests that the primary targets of his proposed DR are those taxpayers "interested in using tax shelters to game the system."
22
It appears, moreover, that there is no real difference between the DR and the current regime with respect to the treatment of evaders. Raskolnikov concedes that evaders will generally opt for the CR rather than the DR. In the CR they avoid exposure to the DR's high penalty rates, and they do not mind the pro-IRS tilt to dispute resolution in the CR because they have no hope of prevailing on the merits under either regime.
23
Raskolnikov's response to this problem-which he acknowledges has "no perfect solutions" 24 -is to identify various situations in which it seems reasonable to force probable evaders into the DR by denying them the CR option.
25
His examples include taxpayers who do not file returns, taxpayers who do not pay assessed tax liabilities, "informal suppliers" in the cash economy, and taxpayers previously found guilty of tax evasion in the CR.
26
Something along these lines may indeed be the best that can be done with this difficult problem, but forcing some taxpayers into the DR is inconsistent with the choice-based rationale for Raskolnikov's tworegime proposal. A major justification for the two-regime approach is that the high DR penalties necessary to deter gamers are made politically acceptable by the fact that the DR penalties apply only to those taxpayers who elect the DR. In Raskolnikov's words, "Taxpayer choice, of course, is at the center of the dual regime. And so it should be. It is clear that a substantial increase in statutory fines is all but impossible if the fines are applied across the board." 27 Raskolnikov's solution to the problem of evaders, however, is to impose the DR and its high penalties on certain categories of probable evaders. To the extent higher penalty rates on certain types of taxpayers are politically and morally acceptable in the absence of the taxpayer choice justification, 28 higher penalties for these disfavored types could be an add-on feature of the current regime (i.e., a tax shelter disclosure regime combined with special high penalty rates applicable to specified likely-evader categories) just as easily as they could be an add-on feature of Raskolnikov's ordinarily choice-based system. In short, evaders are really outside both the current tax shelter disclosure regime and Raskolnikov's choice-based proposal, and so provide no basis for preferring one regime to the other.
The case of non-shelter avoiders is different from that of outright evaders. Many non-shelter avoiders would opt into the DR under Rasknolnikov's proposal, but they are unaffected by the current tax shelter disclosure requirements. In this respect, Raskolnikov's proposal may be superior to the present regime. It is far from clear, however, that this superiority is significant enough to justify preferring the proposal to current law. As discussed below, 29 the proposal requires drastic changes in the compliance rules applicable to non-gamers, and does so primarily for the purpose of facilitating the separation of gamers from nongamers-rather than because the CR is inherently more appropriate than current law for non-gamers. If one is not convinced of the inherent merits of applying the CR to non-gamers-for example, of denying nongamers access to the courts, and of arbitrating non-gamers' disputes with the IRS under a strong pro-government presumption-the need to change the rules applicable to non-gamers in order to improve compliance among non-shelter avoiders may be a significant disadvantage of the proposal. In deciding whether that disadvantage is outweighed by the desirable effects of the proposal on non-shelter avoiders, it would be very helpful to have some sense of the magnitude of the non-shelter avoider problem, in terms of both the number of taxpayers of that type, and the dollars of tax avoided. However, the magnitude of this problem is not made clear in Raskolnikov's discussion. 30 27. Id. at 742. 28. For whatever it may be worth, my own sense is that it may be politically and morally acceptable to force into the DR non-filers, non-payers, and previous evaders in the CR, but neither politically nor morally acceptable to force informal suppliers into the DR merely because tax evasion is widespread in the cash economy.
29. See infra Part II.C. 30. Raskolnikov, supra note 1, at 726 (describing non-shelter avoiders in qualitative terms, but making no attempt at quantification).
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B. Deterrence by High Penalties Versus Deterrence by Near-Certainty of Detection
Under Raskolnikov's proposal, the government would commit to "not us [ing] the new information about taxpayers (their choice of regime) to adjust its examination strategy." 31 Thus, any difference between audit rates in the DR and those in the CR would be attributable to factors other than taxpayers' regime choices. Tax shelter users in the DR would face very high penalty rates, but would have a significant chance of avoiding audit.
32 Under current law, by contrast, tax shelter users face a near certainty of detection (assuming the taxpayers comply with the tax shelter disclosure requirements), but modest penalty rates. Section 6662A imposes a penalty at the rate of twenty percent on "reportable transaction understatements," with the rate increased to thirty percent in the case of an understatement with respect to a position not disclosed on the taxpayer's return.
33
The usual twenty percent penalty rate under section 6662A is identical to the twenty percent penalty rate applicable with respect to non-tax shelter substantial understatements under section 6662.
34
Of course, any desired level of deterrence-that is, any expected cost of tax avoidance-can be produced either by a combination of high penalties and low odds of detection (as in Raskolnikov's approach to tax shelters), or by a combination of low penalties and high odds of detection (as under the current tax shelter disclosure regime). Given the deterrence equivalence of the two approaches, the choice between them must be made on other grounds. There is a strong horizontal equity argument in favor of the low-penalties-plus-nearly-certaindetection approach of current law. Suppose the appropriate level of deterrence with respect to ten taxpayers, each of whom uses a tax shelter in an attempt to avoid $100,000 of tax, can be produced by either (1) subjecting each taxpayer to a one hundred percent chance of detection and the imposition of a twenty percent penalty (resulting in a certain tax-plus-penalty of $120,000 for each taxpayer), or (2) subjecting each taxpayer to a ten percent chance of detection and a tax-plus-penalty of $1,200,000 in the case of detection. Given the fact that all ten taxpayers are identically situated (except with respect to their good or bad luck, in the case of the second regime), the regime that treats all ten identically is fairer than the regime which permits nine to avoid tax while imposing 31. Id. at 752. 32. Raskolnikov does not discuss what would happen to tax shelter disclosure rules under his proposal, but the logic of his proposal suggests they would be repealed. If they were not repealed, audit rates in the DR for tax shelter users -the most important category of taxpayers in the DR-would be much higher than audit rates in the CR, and Raskolnikov indicates he does not want that result. Id. at 752-53. The purpose of the high penalties in the DR is to deter taxpayers despite a significant chance of avoiding detection; the high penalties would not be needed if detection were nearly certain as a result of tax shelter disclosure requirements.
33. I.R.C. § 6662A(a) (2006) (twenty percent penalty); id. § 6662A(c) (thirty percent penalty).
34. See id. § § 6662(a), 6662(b)(2).
